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On July 10, 2025, the Commission launched a 12-week public consultation on proposed reforms to the EU’s antitrust procedural rules.

Key Areas of Reform and Policy Options

Concerned by the lengthy duration of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance investigations—averaging five years—it is no surprise that the Commission is seeking to increase the speed and efficiency of its procedural rules under Regulation 1/2003. This is especially pressing in fast-moving digital markets, where lengthy proceedings can render enforcement actions obsolete by the time a decision is reached. For example, the Google Shopping case took over seven years from investigation to the final decision, highlighting the protracted nature of abuse of dominance cases.[1] In these markets, rapid changes in technologies and competitive dynamics during the course of an investigation can undermine the effectiveness of any eventual remedy.

The rules, now over 20 years old, were drafted in an era when evidence was primarily in paper form, before the explosion of digital data and the advent of cloud-based storage. The reform is part of the Commission’s response to the of September 2024, which called for the EU to be more competitive on the global stage. The Commission’s of January 2025 identified regulatory simplification as a key enabler for this goal.

The Commission has identified five areas for reform. The first four focus on enhancing the efficiency and speed of Commission procedures, particularly as messages become more complex, digital and ephemeral. The fifth area addresses inconsistent enforcement at the national level, which results from stricter approaches at Member State level to unilateral conduct. All consultation documents can be found on the Commission’s .

• Modernising Investigations. As document storage shifts from paper and on-premise systems to digital content stored in the cloud, the Commission is considering new powers to preserve both digital and physical evidence and to conduct fully remote inspections, including accessing cloud-based data. It is also considering expanding its current limited power to invite (but not compel) interviews, to require mandatory interviews, with sanctions for non-compliance.
• Faster Decision-Making. Current procedures for imposing interim measures and accepting commitments are often slow and resource-intensive.[2] The legal test for interim measures is viewed as burdensome and overly restrictive. The Commission’s 2019 Broadcom case was the first in nearly 20 years where interim measures were imposed at EU level, highlighting both their rarity and the procedural hurdles involved.[3] Here, the Commission ordered Broadcom to cease certain exclusivity practices during the investigation. The case is viewed as a turning point, with Commissioner Vestager stating that interim measures are “one way to tackle the challenge of enforcing our competition rules in a fast and effective manner…[which] is why they are so important, especially in fast-moving markets.”[4] To address these challenges, the Commission is considering lowering the jurisdictional threshold for imposing interim measures and streamlining urgent procedures, which could include taking decisions without hearing the other party. Additionally, to encourage faster case resolution, the Commission is considering introducing deadlines for parties to offer commitments addressing competition concerns.
• Improved Access to File. The surge in data creation presents the Commission with the two-fold challenge of managing large volumes of digital data and creating non-confidential versions of files. The Commission is exploring the wider use of confidentiality rings instead of creating full, non-confidential files. It is also considering sanctions for breaches of confidentiality.
• Simplifying Third-Party Participation. The Commission finds that the current complaints handling system is resource-intensive and complex. To reduce complexity, the Commission is considering removing the requirements for formal rejection decisions for complainants and harmonising the procedural rights of complainants and other third parties.
• Addressing Divergent National Laws. Finally, the Commission turns its gaze to the divergence at Member State level, where Member States may apply stricter rules on unilateral conduct than those under EU law. To promote consistent enforcement, the Commission is consulting on enhancing coordination among national authorities and considering limiting Member States’ ability to apply stricter national rules on unilateral conduct.

Key Takeaways

• The Commission is seeking evidence on the costs, burdens and effectiveness of the current antitrust regime, as well as feedback on proposed reforms. This consultation is a key opportunity to help shape the next generation of procedural rules to enforce EU antitrust law.
• The proposed reforms are not a fundamental departure from Regulation 1/2003 in most respects, which should provide a degree of legal certainty and predictability. Yet, certain proposals—such as the possibility of imposing interim measures without a full hearing—would represent a significant change from the current regime.
• While reforms to speed up and simplify antitrust investigations are welcome, it should protect the parties’ ability to exercise their rights of defense effectively. The Broadcom case demonstrates both the potential value and the risks of interim measures in fast-moving markets, where delays can render enforcement ineffective but procedural shortcuts may undermine fairness.

Conclusion & Next Steps

The proposed changes aim to make EU antitrust enforcement more efficient and better suited to the realities of digital and cross-border business. Stakeholders are strongly encouraged to participate in the Commission’s , open for 12 weeks until 2 October 2025. Feedback will inform the Commission’s impact assessment and final reforms, with an impact assessment report expected by Q3 2026. As the changes will require new legislation, they are unlikely to take effect for several years.

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[1] See https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39740.

[2] See Wouter P.J. Wils, “The European Commission’s Cartel Settlement Procedure: An Assessment After Fifteen Years”. This comprehensive analysis examines all European Commission cartel cases concluded between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2023. The average duration of cartel proceedings in this time period was approximately five years (1,841 days), with cases resolved through settlement averaging about four years and nine months (1,727 days), and those under the standard procedure averaging five years (1,823 days). Hybrid cases, involving both settlement and standard procedures, took significantly longer, averaging over six years (2,297 days).

[3] See https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40608.

[4] See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6115.